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The Body as a Selfing Device 
The Case of Anorexia Nervosa 
Cor Baerveldt and Paul Voestennans 
UNIVERSITY OF NIJMEGEN 
ABSTRACT. Psychology's conceptualization of anorexia nervosa illustrates 
how the discipline deals with the body. On the one hand, there is an 
emphasis on the body as a physiological apparatus. On the other hand, 
specific approaches such as social constructionism stress the non-
physiological body as something to which certain discursive meanings get 
attached. We propose to view the body as a producer of meaning in its own 
right, as a 'selfing device'. To this end we emphasize bodily communi-
cation as a continuous flow of co-regulated interaction. The body presents 
itself as the natural juncture of 'co-regulative skills'. The 'selfing process' 
involves multiple stylized bodily skills that testify to people's ability to 
take part in the life-world. Anorexia is seen as a disturbance of those 
skills. 
KEY WoRDs: anorexia nervosa, bodily skills, co-regulation, embodiment, 
social constructionism 
Anorexia nervosa involves the body. The question is: which body? Is it just 
the biological apparatus or organism, as the body might be referred to, or the 
body as a means of expressing feelings and emotions and as a mode of self-
presentation? Or is it a combination? These are the probing questions for this 
paper. Not just the patient is involved bodily. Anorexia also presents a case 
for psychology's involvement with the body. However, the body as such is 
hardly a subject-matter for psychology. Psychology is a science 'buried in 
thought', locked up in phrases, so to speak. Insofar as science is a matter of 
searching for explanations, being buried in thought is not a problem, of 
course, but if the scientific focus is merely on what people think or talk 
about, psychology is robbed unduly of much of its material. The body 
presents a psychological world of its own, to which the case of anorexia 
nervosa will give us some access. 
The adjective 'nervosa', which was included in the diagnostic label of this 
eating disorder right from the outset (Bromberg, 1988), suggests a belief in 
a kind of 'nervous' basis. Nervous did not imply bodily (neural) processes. 
Mental processes were included under that label as well. So the dispute 
centred immediately on the bodily vs the mental basis of the disorder. It has 
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remained this way until the present time in those literatures in which a 
materialistic stance on behavioural and psychological issues is played off 
against a mentalistic one. Social constructionist attempts to come to grips 
with anorexia nervosa have tended to circumvent this dualistic dispute by 
emphasizing that the body is a complex cluster of cultural constructions. In 
this case the medical and biological perspective on the body is enriched by 
one in which bodily states and functions are related to self and identity. In 
this paper we want to explore this new perspective in order to understand the 
role played by the body in ordinary ways of living. First, the social 
constructionist choice for the non-physiological body is discussed. The 
linguistic bias of social constructionism is criticized in order to explore the 
communicative aspects of the body in a much more refined way. In our view 
the body is a 'selfing' device. The neologism 'selfing' is used deliberately. 
Research on the self tends to ignore the process side of the self. The notion 
of 'selfing' attempts to capture the activities through which the person 
becomes a social and personal self. We argue that the body is important in 
that regard. 
The Body in Social Constructionism 
In contemporary psychological reflections on self and emotions, the body 
seems to play a minor role except in the age-old form of the 'soft machine, 
stuffed with tender little wires and tubes', to use an expression by the Dutch 
poet Leo Vroman (1957). Social constructionism unmistakably has some-
thing to say about the body, but rather polemically. Theories that assign an 
important role to the physiological body in the constitution of emotions and 
feelings are de-emphasized (Averill, 1980; Harre, 1986; Ratner, 1989). 
There is a difference in how physiology is played down, depending on 
whether the weak or strong, radical version of social constructionism is 
adopted (Armon-Jones, 1986; Terwee, 1995). Social constructionism in its 
'weak' form does not deny the existence of a limited range of natural 
emotional responses. Yet proponents of this form seem to agree that human 
experience, including the experience of the body, can become meaningfully 
connected with a sense of self only within the context of a cultural system of 
beliefs and values (Armon-Jones, 1986; Hochschild, 1983; Sarbin, 1986a, 
1986b). The 'strong' version of social constructionism denies the relevance 
of physiological processes altogether. Weak and strong constructionism 
alike try to limit the medical and biological usurpation of the body. All 
social constructionists argue that viewing the body from a medical or 
biological perspective can only limit the understanding of its role in the way 
humans live. But what, then, is this role? To put it more sharply, does the 
body have a role in the production of meaning? The answer to this question 
is pertinent to the way anorexia is dealt with. 
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One thing is quite clear as far as the social constructionist perspective on 
the body is concerned: by contesting that physiology is central to the process 
of experiencing, body and physiology are implicitly equated. The two are 
collapsed and functional electro-chemical bodily processes have no bearing 
on the production of meaning, save for the fact that these processes are seen 
as merely conditional. It is quite obvious that, once certain bodily parts or 
systems are damaged, behavior will suffer as well. 
In order to avoid the immediate drawback of a purely mentalistic view of 
meaning, social constructionism emphasizes a non-physiological body. 
From this perspective, the states and functions of the body become a cluster 
of cultural instead of natural, that is, biological, constructions. The formative 
and rhetorical aspects of language have a strong bearing on these cultural 
constructions. Language in, for example, the form of emotion talk and 
emotion words (Heelas, 1981; Lutz, 1986, 1988) or as narrative plots and 
everyday story-lines (Gergen & Gergen, 1983, 1984, 1988; Sarbin, 1986a, 
1986b) becomes the main locus of socially constructed meaning. Con-
structionists claim that these 'meanings' penetrate psychological life in all 
its facets. The body is a rather shallow participant in this scheme because it 
is introduced, for example, in the conception of an emotion as 'a bodily 
enactment of a moral judgment or attitude in accordance with the conven-
tions of local dramatistic roles' (Harre, 1991, p. 142; Sarbin, 1986b). Put 
more generally, the structure and meaning of bodily conduct originate from 
discursively constructed cultural resources that provide the scripts carried 
out by bodily gestures and postures. As will be shown in a moment, this 
non-physiological, 'dramatistic' body, which is constructed discursively 
from cultural resources, has undergone an interesting fate that has had a 
strong bearing on anorexia nervosa. 
Politicizing the Social Constructionists' Body 
Since the appearance of Berger and Luckmann' s book The Social Construc-
tion of Reality (1966), it has become understood among constructionists that 
meaning and knowledge are produced in social interactions. They have also 
stressed that meaning and knowledge are constitutive of those very same 
interactions. Social constructionists have tended to emphasize only this latter 
point. As a consequence, empirical research has been restricted mostly to the 
analysis of already produced texts (Sarbin, 1986a; Shotter & Gergen, 1989). 
More recently, however, a shift of focus has occurred. The emphasis is no 
longer on culture as an already constructed linguistic order, but on the 
production and maintenance of meaning and identity in the course of 
everyday conversational interactions and discursive practices (Harre & 
Gillett, 1994; Shotter, 1993, 1995). The dynamic and productive aspects of 
linguistic interactions are put to the fore. This implies an emphasis on 
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conversation, conflicts, dilemmas and relations of power and domination 
(Billig, 1987, 1988; Edwards, 1991; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). This 
political variant of social constructionism brought about a renewed interest 
in the human body. Feminist authors especially have used a constructionist 
or discursive framework in order to show how people are classified by 
reference to their bodies (Butler, 1990, 1993; Jaggar, 1983; Jaggar & Bordo, 
1992). Seemingly biological or naturally given categories like male/female 
and categories of sexual orientation such as 'homosexual', 'bisexual', 'gay' 
and 'lesbian' are revealed as being entirely socially constructed. The 
politicizing of the body goes along with an emphasis on the obedience of the 
body to the scripts of the dominant ethic, be it the ethic of heterosexuality, 
masculinity, femininity, but also of homosexuality, the submissive tradi-
tional female care-giving functions or dominant male public functions 
(Kitzinger, 1987, 1992; Unger, 1989, 1992). With this emphasis on body 
politics, the body is given a central place in psychological thought. Yet the 
question can be raised whether this politicizing still adheres to the general 
social constructionist perspective of a body to which meaning is added. 
Moreover, in this political outlook the body becomes meaningful only 
insofar as discursive meanings such as those depicted in the mass media or 
in social scientific and psychological discourse get attached to it. To 
exaggerate a bit, the body becomes a sort of mannequin which 'wears' the 
signs of sex, power, status, and the like, and as such serves as the 
battleground for body politics (Merwe & V oestermans, 1995). 
In this overview we have lumped together all the social constructionists, 
even though Harre, for example, is very different from Gergen and both 
differ from Shatter, to name only the most prominent constructionists. The 
point we are trying to make is that no matter what nuances can be seen in 
their texts, the body remains an entity to which socially constructed 
meanings are added. The question we want to raise now is: what are the 
consequences of this theoretical stance for the understanding of anorexia 
nervosa? 
Anorexia Nervosa and the Mannequin Body: Gains and 
Criticism 
A brief survey of the literature regarding anorexia nervosa shows that early 
explanations tended to psychologize the syndrome, neglecting both its 
cultural aspects and the body in its own right. Psychoanalytic explanations, 
for example, interpret anorexia as the fear of oral impregnation and the 
rejection of female sexuality (Thoma, 1967; Waller, Kaufman, & Deutsch, 
1940). From the 1950s onward, ego-psychological and object-relational 
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interpretations of orality came to emphasize the process of separation from 
the mother in the development of solid ego boundaries. Anorexia was 
interpreted as the consequence of 'ego-weakness', which resulted in what 
Bruch (1974) has called 'a paralyzing sense of ineffectiveness'. During the 
1970s ego-psychological approaches were broadened by positions that 
emphasized the social and cultural aspects of identity formation. Selvini-
Palazzoli (1974) and Minuchin, Rosman and Baker (1978) assigned a central 
role to communication patterns within the family system that hinder the 
development of an autonomous sense of identity. The mothers of anorectics 
especially were depicted as frustrated, over-protective women who did not 
acknowledge their daughters' autonomy (Bruch, 1978; Selvini-Palazzoli, 
1974). Later feminist-oriented authors like Lawrence (1984) and Chemin 
(1986) pointed to the social position of modem, highly educated women, in 
which they are forced to conform both to the modem demands of a career 
and to those of traditional care-giving and motherhood. In particular, the role 
of the mother was reinterpreted by representing her as a woman who had 
been pressed by societal demands to give up her own ambitions and 
exclusively dedicate herself to the family. Both mother and daughter were 
seen as victims of a patriarchal society. 
Current research into the genesis of anorexia has given up, for the most 
part, the attempt to explain from a single variable. Instead it is assumed that 
anorexia has multiple causes (Garfinkel & Gamer, 1982). Non-specific 
psychological factors like low self-esteem, perfectionism and social un-
certainty all presumably contribute to the genesis of the syndrome. In most 
of these explanatory efforts the body plays a minor role. The non-
physiological body appears on the stage most often as the cultural ideal of 
thinness, pressing women to keep trying to lose weight. On the basis of an 
investigation of Playboy centrefolds and Miss America Pageant contestants 
in the period 1959-78, Gamer, Garfinkel, Schwartz and Thompson (1980) 
demonstrated that a shift occurred to a more slender standard. More recently, 
the same trend was found for the years 1979-88 (Wiseman, Gray, Mosimann, 
& Ahrens, 1992). Gamer et al. suggested that the postwar increase in 
anorexia nervosa is partly due to these changing cultural ideals for beauty 
and success. Nevertheless, although the ideal of slenderness can probably 
throw some light on the question as to why so many women in our society 
are preoccupied with trying to lose weight, it falls short as an explanation of 
anorexia nervosa. It remains unclear how the cultural appreciation of the 
female body can penetrate into the subjective experience of the body to such 
an extent that it makes some women modify and even mutilate their own 
bodies. Moreover, the striking observation about anorexia is the fact that 
these women persist in their attempt to lose weight and yet continue to 
report that they feel fat. It is quite unlikely that the cultural standard of a 
slender female body continues to motivate them. Diaries and other ego-
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documents of anorectics (e.g. Dunbar, 1986; Macleod, 1982) show that the 
weight anorectic women set for themselves is constantly pushed downward, 
which suggests that they are striving for body control rather than aiming at 
some idealized body shape. 
A central argument in feminist explanations of anorexia nervosa has been 
the politicizing of the body along the lines discussed above. Anorexia 
nervosa has been interpreted both as an over-identification with sex role 
stereotypes (Boskind-Lodahl, 1976) and as a symbolic protest against the 
social position of women in society, involving a dismissal of these very 
same stereotypes (Orbach, 1985). Both Orbach and Boskind-Lodahl state 
that the social judgment of fatness is inherently sexist. It reflects the 
dominant male discourse about preferred female body shape. 
For Boskind-Lodahl the modification of the body is a symptom of social 
inadequacy and the lack of self-esteem due to social stereotypes of femin-
inity. This perceived inadequacy and the fear of being rejected by their 
social environment cause some women to adopt a passive and accommodat-
ing approach to life and an obsession with appearance and body shape. At 
first, they try to lose weight in order to live up to the perceived preferences 
of men, but eventually slimming becomes a means of reducing fear and 
social uncertainty in general. Orbach considers the body a medium of 
communication, a way of expressing something which cannot be said in 
words. The anorectic's body carries a message, which should be read as a 
message of protest. Orbach explicitly uses the metaphor of the hunger strike 
to make this point. 
Although both Boskind-Lodahl and Orbach emphasize that the body is a 
means of expression, it remains a mannequin and a battleground for body 
politics. In essence, the assignment of meaning takes place by an outside 
observer rather than by the anorectic herself. The message of protest has to 
be inferred from a political analysis. This means that the excessive slimming 
is in fact considered as symptomatic of a given social order, rather than as a 
way to communicate about, or to protest against, this social order. By 
politicizing the female body this way, the body as the expressive medium of 
a real person gets out of focus. The body becomes an arena of political 
dispute in which the anorectic herself doesn't take part as an individual 
(Lenning, 1990). Anorexia serves as the arena for 'identity politics' (Samp-
son, 1993), which takes place outside the psychological reality of the day to 
day practices of the anorectic herself that claim and sustain an identity in the 
course of everyday social interactions. Orbach persists in a view of the body 
as the bearer of meanings which are eventually produced in a discursive 
process. This process takes place without the anorectic being part of it. It 
acquires those mean,ings only within the context of a dominant sexist 
discursive order. In that regard the body merely represents the feminist 
challenge of that order. 
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Extending the Discursive Paradigm: The Body as Language 
The body as mannequin and the body as an arena for body politics both fail 
to explain how the body serves as a meaning-producing device in its own 
right. If we want to come to grips with the role of anorectics as women who 
are bodies of flesh and bones and do not just have a body as a cluster of 
politicized meanings attached to it, the body as a communicative device 
needs to be understood. One attempt to do exactly that is the social 
constructionist extension of the notion of discourse in such a way that it 
includes the communicative use of the body. Harre and Gillett (1994) 
proceeded that way and contended that 'it is a main thesis of discursive 
psychology that episodes in which psychological phenomena are brought 
into being by the use of nonlinguistic signs should be analyzed as if they 
were through and through linguistic' (p. 99). The implications of this 
contention for social constructionists' dealings with the body become 
apparent from Harre's design for a 'corporeal semantics'. He noted that 
'[t]he human body is such that its states, conditions, parts and postures serve 
as signs. It is both a semiotic system in itself and made meaningful by a 
semiotic system' (Harre, 1991, p. 223) 
The claim that some sort of linguistics can provide a model for psychol-
ogy in which the body is included is not new. Birdwhistell (1952), for 
example, stated long ago that 'it has to become clear that there are body 
behaviors which function like significant sounds, that combine into simple 
or relatively complex units like words, which are combined into much 
longer stretches of structured behavior like sentences or even paragraphs' 
(p. 80). The idea of bodily conduct as a patterned sequence of structural 
units, analogous to those of language, is also found in the work of Scheften 
(1964). 
Kristeva (1968/1978) was the first to criticize Birdwhistell for reducing 
communication to the exchange of information. She was particularly appre-
hensive about the reduction of praxis-the way people are immersed in their 
daily doings-to representations. A comparable critique was given more 
recently by Radley (1991). He explained that the restricted attention to body 
movements as communicative acts leaves out the possibility for analysing 
bodily conduct as a cultural practice in its own right. To further clarify this 
point, Radley criticized the reduction of non-verbal behaviour to com-
munication. He referred to the contribution of Wiener, Devoe, Rubinow and 
Geller (1972), who pointed out that in the studies of non-verbal behaviour 
the notion of sign is easily confused with that of communication. Body 
movements or other bodily signs signal a certain state of affairs, but this is 
not the same as communication. What Wiener and others attempted to 
convey is that as soon as bodily conduct, which 'tells' the onlooker 
something about the person, is treated as a communicative act, the body of 
that person becomes an integral part of what the receiver perceives. On the 
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perceiver's side a kind of message is decoded. Of course, we do that 
frequently-read off other people's bodily signs and cast them in a linguistic 
form. But by doing so our focus is entirely on the observer's (receiver's) 
judgements of certain postures or gestures. Through these judgements bodily 
movements and non-verbal signs are turned into something language-like, 
into linguistic communication. However, postures and gestures are not 
necessarily discursively produced. That may be the case when there is a 
deliberate effort, as in sign language. Yet a propositionally organized or 
argumentatively structured message, which subsequently generates signs, 
need not always be present. This last assertion is crucial for a new 
understanding of the body as a selfing device or a meaning-producing 
device. The recipient's understanding of bodily signs as a communication or 
as carrying a message should not be projected onto the producer's mind, as 
if it was this mind which formed messages by bodily means. 
Radley was right in criticizing the rather self-evident practice of viewing 
non-verbal communication as linguistic communication. It becomes linguis-
tic only by a rather specific and separate process. The notion of communi-
cation is also misleading. The process of the production of signs should not 
be confused with the process by which they are turned into a communicative 
message by the recipient's interpretation. In order to demarcate the notion of 
communication, Wiener et al. asserted that the signs of the body can 
rightfully be called communication only if the person who acts has the 
intention of making something public. Furthermore, she or he has to make 
use of a socially shared signal system or code in order to make this possible. 
In case these conditions are not met, bodily conduct should be considered as 
'symptomatic' of a certain bodily state rather than being viewed as com-
munication. Shivering, for example is 'symptomatic' of the fact that some-
body is cold, but should not be considered as communication about feeling 
cold. 
Anorexia nervosa is often viewed as symptomatic. Feminist explanations 
especially view the body of the anorectic as part of a social symptomatology. 
The body is a site of interest for investigators who want to understand 
subordination and power. The anorectic body refers to experiences of 
domination and submissiveness and therefore the body becomes sympto-
matic of particular social situations. It is a signalling system about what 
these women suffer from, one that is much more ornate than mere words, but 
a signalling system nevertheless. Anorexia is a sign that the sufferers are 
entrapped in certain demands that are made upon their bodies. The presence 
of strong cultural ideals, for example, causes the anorectic women to 
exaggerate the control over their bodies in order to live up to those 
standards. A body presentation is created that gives away the anorectic's 
lack of ego strength and betrays the submission to cultural demands 
(Chemin, 1986; Lawrence, 1984). In most literature this lack of ego strength 
is related to certain family dynamics in which the mother plays a crucial role 
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(Bruch, 1978; Chemin, 1986; Lawrence, 1984; Selvini-Palazzoli, 1974). 
Moreover, it is stressed that the social and cultural system as a whole and not 
just the family itself is responsible for the way parental behaviour is 
entrapped in demands that are counterproductive with respect to the anor-
ectic's ego. 
By contrasting the symptomatic with communication proper, Wiener and 
others have drawn a line between communication and signalling a certain 
state of affairs. Communication is restricted to sending a message. Radley 
(1991, p. 85) showed that Wiener et al. opened up the possibility for asking 
questions about those forms of bodily conduct which are in their terms not 
communicative but symptomatic, although their main objective lies in the 
reconceptualization of communication. According to Radley, Wiener et al. 
seem not to have taken advantage of that possibility. He claimed that it is as 
important to try to discover the social underpinnings of those symptomatic 
aspects as it is for communication proper. In that sense the borderline 
between the two cannot be drawn as strictly as Wiener et al. suggested. What 
is defined as 'symptomatic' has its social underpinnings as well; or, at the 
very best, we cannot exclude this as a possibility. Studies into the history of 
manners and bodily practices, for example, show that seemingly sympto-
matic bodily processes, such as sneezing, spitting and belching, are in fact 
socially regulated (Elias, 1978). Radley asserted that a study of the body in 
social life should include the investigation of bodily styles and practices. 
Mauss already stated in his 1935 essay on 'the techniques of the body' that 
there exists an 'education of movements' which inscribes itself into ex-
pressive style of all bodily performances (Mauss, 1935/1973). It is this 
project of the culturally inscripted body that we want to pursue. 
From the perspective of the anorectic, the body is involved in all kinds of 
social arrangements. These do not provide a passive background, but rather 
form the active context in which the so-called 'symptoms' are a form of 
bodily meaning production that should not be ignored, even if an outside 
observer (receiver) fails to catch this meaning. Therefore, we would like to 
broaden Wiener et al.'s restrictive view on communication in such a way 
that it includes all bodily conduct which contributes to the production of 
meaning and which is somehow socially regulated. This broadening implies 
a redefinition of communication. The redefinition we would like to suggest 
is one in terms of 'co-regulation'. 
Communication as Co-regulation 
Wiener et al. rightly pose a question about the criteria of communication, but 
ultimately persist in what could be called the linguistic bias. They narrow 
their view to those modes of communication which rely on the use of a code 
or a socially shared signal system. It is obvious that this restriction excludes 
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not only communicative behaviour as it is studied by ethologists, but also 
those forms of human expressivity which are non-discursive and non-
propositional. In her classical study on symbolism, Susan Langer ( 1951) had 
already demonstrated that discursive or linguistic symbolism is one way 
among others of communicating meaning. Others include the non-linguistic 
modes of symbolization Langer calls rituals. Ritual is a form of presen-
tational instead of representational symbolism. While language involves 
the sequential combination of smaller structural units into larger ones, 
presentational symbolism cannot easily be split up into meaningful units. 
Presentational forms derive their meaning from the simultaneous coordi-
nation of the whole. The meaning of a presentational form like dance, for 
example, resides not in the combination of smaller behavioural units, but in 
the expressive quality of the movement as a whole. 
In contrast to discursive meanings, presentational forms lack an explicit 
structure of the either/or kind. They can be considered forms with strong 
semantics and weak syntax. Therefore they cannot easily be translated into 
well-articulated statements of a discursive repertoire. Presentational forms 
can be found in artistic expression, dance and rituals, but also in everyday 
emotional expression. 
That brings us to another reason why communication should be broadened 
to include those non-linguistic, presentational forms. By claiming that the 
encoder instead of the decoder of a message provides the final criterion of 
communication, Wiener et al. persist in the common metaphor of com-
munication as something which is produced somewhere, subsequently 
transmitted through a communication channel, and finally delivered to a 
receiver. Fogel (1993) demonstrates that terms like 'sender', 'receiver' and 
'signal' belong to the description of 'discrete state communication systems', 
in which the actors can only be in one of several clear-cut discretely 
different states (p. 27). In such systems, the actors alternately have to adopt 
the role of sender and receiver. Although this description may seem 
adequate in the case of the exchange of written messages like letters or 
formal oral communications such as debates, it falls short as a description of 
'continuous process communications systems'. In a continuous process 
system it is impossible to determine who is the sender and who is the 
receiver. Instead the communication dynamically unfolds as a ceaseless flow 
of mutually induced action and adaptation. Fogel refers to this communi-
cative process as 'co-regulation', 'the dynamic balancing act by which a 
smooth social performance is created out of the continuous mutual adjust-
ment of action between partners' (p. 19). So the criterion to decide that a 
given interaction is communicative resides in the organization of the system 
as a whole and not in one of the participating actors. This point was already 
emphasized by Birdwhistell, who was indicted by Wiener et al. for not 
distinguishing between communications and signs. By restricting themselves 
to the communicative qualities of discrete informational units, Wiener et al. 
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pass over in silence the actual flow of co-regulated action that specifies the 
communicative process. 
A comparable point was put forward by Varela and Maturana (1984). 
They showed that the metaphor of communication as the transfer of 
information through discrete communication channels, appealing as it may 
seem in an age of mass media and flows of coded information, is both 
biologically and epistemologically inadequate. This view of communication 
presupposes that the behaviour produced by the sender is instructive with 
regard to what goes on at the receiver's end. Furthermore, the message is 
supposed to hold an informational content independent from the inter-
pretation of the receiver or sender. However, it is quite obvious that the 
meaning of what is communicated is neither determined by the intentions of 
the sender, nor can it be found in the fixed relation f?etween a sign and its 
conventional referent. Instead, it is dynamically produced in the communi-
cation process itself. Carrying on the phenomenological body project initi-
ated by Merleau-Ponty, Varela and Maturana emphasize the embodied 
structure of meaning in the widest possible sense (Varela & Maturana, 1984; 
Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). Its essentially dialogical character, 
which points at a very vital co-construction of meaning, should not be 
overlooked (Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Hermans, Kempen, & Loon, 1992). 
To not account for this dialogical character of meaning in which both sides 
are emphasized reduces co-constructed meaning to information and co-
regulated action to mere instruction. All that is left is a message. 
An important conclusion can be drawn from this co-regulative view of 
communication. It implies that a strong emphasis should be placed on what 
could be called 'co-regulative skills'. This type of skill should not be 
confused with the social skills or competence on which the social skill 
approach of mental health generally focuses. This approach relates mental 
disorders, like anorexia nervosa, to social inadequacy and a lack of social 
competence, especially the competence to deploy the body in social inter-
course (Trower, Bryant, & Argyle, 1978). It has mainly been developed as a 
social skills training programme for the treatment of mental disorders. 
Radley (1991) demonstrates that this approach overemphasizes the body as a 
means of control that conforms to the norms of society. Trower et al., (1978) 
for example, regard a person as socially inadequate 'if he is unable to affect 
the behaviour and feelings of others in the way that he intends and society 
accepts' (p. 2). According to Radley, this 'technolized' view of the body 
tends to overlook the body as a means of expression. Such a perspective on 
bodily skills is a very limited one, based as it is on the rather objectifying 
image of body techniques as something to be judged against an independent 
social standard and adjusted in accordance with those judgements. This 
approach to bodily skills is based on an instruction paradigm of communi-
cation rather then on a dialogical or co-regulative paradigm. However, as 
experiences in the field of sports, artistic expression and martial arts teach 
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us, bodily skills are not learned by imposing a prescribed, so-called 'right' 
form upon individuals. They are learned by a process that involves the 
progressive development and refinement of bodily sensitivity. This sensitiv-
ity does not concern some private world of inner feelings, but on the 
contrary involves someone's bodily informed knowledge of the life-world. 
This means that bodily movements have to be felt from the inside as it were, 
so that they gradually become a part of one's own expressive register. It is 
not a matter of just imitating a prescribed form. Although the right forms or 
techniques have to be thoroughly trained, mastery is acquired only when 
those techniques become part of a personal style in which the expressive and 
the functional aspects of bodily movements fuse, as in dance, for example. 
Co-regulative Skills aud the Regulation of Bodily Styles 
We have now moved quite far away from Harre's corporeal semantics. 
Harre borrows ideas from the structural semiotics of Roland Barthes (1985). 
It is striking, however, that Barthes's notions can be interpreted differently, 
more in accordance with the co-regulative skills paradigm we are proposing 
here. While Harre refers to Barthes in order to ground his theory of the body 
as a sign system, Douglas (1973) extensively quotes Barthes in order to 
elucidate her conception of style. Style, according to Barthes (1953/1968), 
springs from the body of the writer, from 'the depths of the author's personal 
and secret mythology' (p. 16). It is something which enfolds in a spon-
taneous way beyond his or her control, enacting in a non-representational 
way the 'erotic body' of the author (Barthes, 1973; Bemink, 1989). So 
Barthes acknowledges the body in its experiential and expressive qualities, 
but as was the case with Wiener et al., he also places this type of body 
outside the realm of the social, and equates it mistakenly with the idiosyn-
cratic, 'secret mythology' of the writer. In addition Barthes places the social 
constitution and regulation of bodily style and the contribution of style to the 
production of meaning outside the reach of scientific examination. It is 
Douglas's merit to have put the notion of style back in the centre of her 
anthropological research of the body. 
According to Douglas, the style of any message will coordinate all 
channels along which this message is given. Like Langer, she views the 
body not primarily as the producer of discrete signs. Instead, the signs and 
gestures of the body acquire their meaning by the expressive use of the body 
as a whole. Central in Douglas's anthropology of the body is her claim that 
a social system imposes pressure upon individuals to achieve consonance in 
all levels of experience, thereby producing concordance among the different 
means of expression .. People are pressed to bring their physical experience 
into accordance with their social experience. Therefore the social order 
should be considered an embodied order, of which bodily practices and 
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patterns of embodied experience and understanding are an integral part. So, 
while on the one hand society ritualizes its vital domains by both restricting 
and refining the possibilities for expression, on the other hand, people have 
to develop an expressive register or repertory which is sufficiently differ-
entiated and geared to the social worlds in which they find themselves. 
One way of applying Douglas's conception of bodily style to the field of 
social psychology is to connect it with our broadened theory of communi-
cation and interpersonal relationships. In fact, this involves a return to the 
features of non-verbal communication presented by Bateson some time ago 
(1972). He distinguished four features of this non-verbal mode of com-
munication: it lacks unambiguous negations, tense and any identification of 
linguistic mood, and furthermore is metaphoric, which means that it com-
municates relations rather than statements about objects or things (p. 139). 
Like Langer, Bateson stressed the very specific ordering principles of this 
'analogic' mode of communication. The lacking of negations, for example, 
brings about a specific range of problems. Two dogs which bump into one 
another cannot easily communicate they are not going to fight. Instead they 
have to perform a sham fight by the showing of fangs, engaging in a brawl 
and discovering that neither wants to kill the other (p. 141 ). This means that 
the regulation of non-verbal behaviour involves a clear-cut ritualization of 
expressive forms, consisting of multiple layers of 'signification'. Moreover, 
the example of the dogs demonstrates that a regulation of behaviour is 
possible without the need for a supra-individual moral order and without the 
explicit need for the discursive or linguistic negotiation of power differ-
ences. Instead, ordered forms of behaviour can emerge from the immediate 
co-regulation of expressive bodily activity. 
Anorexia Revisited 
Once the body is conceived of as a natural juncture of co-regulative skills, 
some conclusions with respect to the nature, diagnosis and research of 
anorexia nervosa can be drawn. Introducing the 'subjectified' or 'selfing' 
body into an explanation of anorexia places an emphasis on the competence 
of the subject to claim and sustain an identity. This competence is produced 
or constituted within a historical process but is nevertheless 'real' in the 
sense that it is objectified in durable bodily dispositions (Bourdieu, 1990). 
Viewed this way, anorexia nervosa is not a statement about, or a symbolic 
reference to, the social position of women, but the embodied expression of a 
culturally constituted subject. This has some implications for the diagnosis 
of anorexia. 
The diagnostic criteria of anorexia nervosa which are currently used 
clearly demonstrate the significance of the body in this eating disorder. Both 
medical and psychological criteria play a part in this diagnosis, which relies 
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on the four criteria of the DSM-N (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994). 
First, there must be a persistent refusal to gain weight in spite of being 
about 15 percent below normal weight. A second criterion is amenorrhea, 
that is, a prolonged absence of the menstrual cycle. Third, the anorectic must 
experience an intense fear of gaining weight or becoming fat, and must 
claim to feel fat even when already underweight. The fourth criterion is the 
one which occasioned the most influential line of research into the psycho-
logical aspects of the body, the so-called 'distorted body image'. This 
research was inspired by an article of Bruch's (1962), in which she observed 
that anorexia nervosa involves a disorder of both the perception and 
experience of the body. Part of the discussion that followed her observations 
concerned the question of whether perceptual or cognitive factors are most 
important for an explanation of this distorted body image. Slade and Russell 
(1973), for example, maintained that the disorder is best understood as a 
disturbance of the way the body is perceived. However, most researchers 
emphasize the process of judgement-a cognitive process-in the realiz-
ation of the body image (Garner & Garfinkel, 1981; Huon & Brown, 
1986). 
The way research on body-image distortion is carried out clearly demon-
strates its departure from an objectified view of the body. The method 
applied in the greater part of this research consists of asking women to 
estimate as adequately as possible the width of their own body, using either 
simply drawn silhouettes or complex video distortion equipment. By com-
paring those estimates to their 'real' body size, it is determined whether the 
participant has a distorted representation of her own body. In our view, 
however, this type of research, even though it is related to the real or 
objective body size as part of a diagnostic criterion, obscures the true nature 
of the distorted relation anorectics have to their own body. When viewed 
from the co-regulative skill paradigm, body distortion looks different. 
According to this paradigm, a non-distorted relation to our bodies does not 
imply any reference to our objective body size. When walking through a 
small doorway, for example, we calculate neither the width of the doorway 
nor that of our bodies. Instead we are capable of acting quite adequately by 
using an unmediated, tacit knowledge of the environment and of our bodies 
(Gibson, 1966; Polanyi, 1967). This means that the perception of our 
bodies is to be understood not as a picture, constructed by ourselves as 
outside observers, but as an experience that is thoroughly intertwined with 
our experience of the 'life-world' (Merleau-Ponty, 194511962). This per-
spective raises some serious objections against an understanding of anorexia 
nervosa in terms of a distorted body image. It is not the image of the 
anorectic's body that seems to be distorted, but rather the relation to hc;;r 
social world; the selfing capabilities of her body are an integral part of this 
relationship. Therefore, we need to return to the expressive, communicative 
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body as it was depicted in the preceding paragraphs, in order to examine 
whether this can provide any insights into the embodied nature of 
anorexia. 
In the distorted image research, the body is not only objectified in the eye 
of the researcher. What this research does is to ask women to objectify their 
own body by judging it, as it were, from the outside. Yet, it is exactly this 
extreme objectification of their own body which constitutes the core of the 
anorectics' problem. The anorectic does not experience her body as some-
thing she is, but as something she has, as some sort of 'non-self'. It seems 
quite likely that the objectification of her own body keeps her from getting 
involved bodily in the social world in which she lives. Instead of bemg a 
vital constituent of a meaningful relation to her life-world, the body becomes 
an object of rigid control. 
As we have tried to argue earlier, some feminists and social con-
structionists try to capture the bodily aspect of anorexia nervosa by reducing 
it to a cluster of discursively constructed meanings. However, as demon-
strated above, those meanings pass over in silence the experiential and 
expressive body of the anorectic herself. By recognizing the central role of 
the body in the communicative, co-regulative interaction of the self and its 
social environment, we are able to view anorexia as a distortion of this 
selfing process. We avoid the static notion of self or self-concept, because 
what gets distorted is the process of becoming a self-the selfing process, as 
we call it. This is in accordance with our earlier emphasis on the bodily 
production of meaning rather than on the ascription of meaning to the body. 
Instead of asking for the meaning of the excessive slimming of anorectics, 
we should shift our attention to the competence of deploying their bodies in 
the social process. 
Others as well have shifted the attention from deviant eating behaviour 
and dismissive judgements about the body to factors related to the self. They 
focus on social uncertainty and uncertainty about women's own feelings and 
emotions. By confronting this view with our own, we can make more precise 
what our view entails. 
Anorectics are observed to be especially afraid of spontaneous, informal 
social relations (Appels, 1983; Bruch, 1977, 1978). Not only their eating 
behaviour, but their whole bodily style is characterized by restrained 
expressivity. Restrictive eating behaviour is only one-albeit the most 
conspicuous-aspect of the anorectic's bodily style. Anorectics are unable to 
join the vicissitudes of social interactions in an easy, relaxed way. Instead 
they seem to be constantly aware of themselves, hyper-sensitive to reactions 
of their social environment. Yet this type of sensitivity is misleading. In 
competently co-regulated activity there exists a largely automatic and 
unaware adjustment of one's behaviour to social situations. Anorectics don't 
seem able to enter into an easy flux of social interactions. They seem 
constantly preoccupied, watching and monitoring themselves in a rather 
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laborious way. They keep a tight rein on their own doings. This precludes 
the rather self-evident and easy-going, subtle regulation of their own 
behaviour. Even though they are hyper-conscious of themselves, anorectics 
lack a social souplesse tailored to the demands of the social situation. In this 
regard, parents of anorectics often maintain that their daughters were 
obedient, conforming, non-assertive girls in their pre-anorectic period, which 
seems to be in sharp contrast with the stubborn and persistent behaviour they 
display later on in life (Bruch, 1978; Leon & Finn, 1984). 
This contrast has brought ego-psychological-oriented theorists, especially, 
to the conclusion that the anorectic develops a 'false self or 'pseudo self, 
an enforced identity, based on the rigid control of her own body. This body 
control serves to conceal her feelings of worthlessness and lack of auto-
nomy. Although the body thus becomes part of a some kind of identity 
project, we are faced again with the body as something which does not 
independently contribute to the production of meaning. The notion of a true 
and a false self easily overlooks the body's resilient contribution to the 
selfing process. Bateson (1972, pp. 309-337) already made clear that the 
idea of self-control is based on a mistaken and pathogenic epistemology in 
which the self is split up into a part that is controlled and a part by which the 
control is executed. We want to stress that the rigid body control of 
anorectics involves a practical dualism due to a lack of social souplesse. 
Anorectics experience the body as something they carry with them, some-
thing non-self. The mind, then, is imposed upon it as a device which holds 
firm control over all bodily processes, including expressivity. Bordo (1989) 
emphasizes the same extreme, dysfunctional dualism. According to her, 
anorectics are not just obsessed with body weight as such. They fear 
especially that the weak parts of their body (belly, breasts, buttocks, thighs) 
will escape their control. Bordo states that the fear of bulging· body parts is 
in fact the 'anxiety about internal processes out of control-unrestrained 
desire, unrestrained hunger, uncontrolled impulse' (p. 89). By rigidly 
keeping a check on all of their bodily functions and processes, those women 
try to cover up their feelings of uncertainty and lack of social competence. 
Final Conclusions and Implications 
We can now draw some final conclusions about anorexia nervosa and what 
this disorder has to say about psychology's treatment of the body. Rendering 
the body of the anorectic as a mannequin that shows the effects of 
domination and submission, or as a battleground for feminist arguments, 
dilemmas and discourse, keeps hidden the anorectic's bodily production of 
meaning. Psychology's rather traditional occupation with discursive mean-
ing holds sway over psychological thinking about the body. Yet anorexia 
nervosa is not just there to be interpreted as a message or a symptom which 
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results in a judgement from the outside of what these women 'really' seem 
to convey. The view on communication as co-regulation, espoused in the 
preceding paragraphs, tries to shift the emphasis away from discursive 
meaning and messages to the production of meaning within the selfing 
process. This selfing process implies a social performance which is created 
out of the continual adjustment of the participants to one another. The 
minutiae of that process involve kinds of stylized bodily skills that testify to 
one's ability to take part in the life-world. The body thus becomes a natural 
juncture of co-regulative skills. 
The anorectic's disturbance of bodily practice can now be described more 
adequately. This description will contain a message for psychology in the 
sense that psychology's focus should be more on what the body automat-
ically brings about or fails to bring about. Psychology should be more 
concerned with the bodily production of meaning within the selfing process, 
instead of restricting itself to socially constructed judgements about the 
body. The failure of anorectics, if one may put it that way without morally 
judging those women, is a matter not so much of a distortion of their body 
image as of a lack of co-regulative skills that serve the selfing process. These 
skills are not developed adequately. In consequence, the women who suffer 
from anorexia are much more vulnerable to the pitfalls of an extreme 
dualistic relation to their own bodies, resulting in bodily dissatisfaction and 
need for mental control. Research which has been supportive of the view 
that this dualistic process is often involved frequently limits itself to the 
assessment of discourse about the body and fails to come to grips with 
the subtle details of co-regulation. Such theory and research fails to locate 
the disturbance in the domain of social skills and practices. 
Although the emphasis on social skills and co-regulation suggests that the 
treatment of anorexia nervosa should focus on training and the corroboration 
of such skills from resources in the direct environment of the anorectic 
patient, the authors are not sufficiently clinically competent to draw the 
implications for therapeutic practice. They leave that to the experienced 
reader, who is invited to develop this view of the body in a full-scale 
psychological practice. 
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